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Although many studies have examined the neural basis of empathy, relatively little is
known about how empathic processes are affected by different attentional conditions.
Thus, we examined whether instructions to empathize might amplify responses in
empathy-related regions and whether cognitive load would diminish the involvement
of these regions. Thirty-two participants completed a functional magnetic resonance
imaging session assessing empathic responses to individuals experiencing happy, sad,
and anxious events. Stimuli were presented under three conditions: watching naturally,
actively empathizing, and under cognitive load. Across analyses, we found evidence for a
core set of neural regions that support empathic processes (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex,
DMPFC; medial prefrontal cortex, MPFC; temporoparietal junction, TPJ; amygdala; ventral
anterior insula, AI; and septal area, SA). Two key regions—the ventral AI and SA—were
consistently active across all attentional conditions, suggesting that they are automatically
engaged during empathy. In addition, watching vs. empathizing with targets was not
markedly different and instead led to similar subjective and neural responses to others’
emotional experiences. In contrast, cognitive load reduced the subjective experience of
empathy and diminished neural responses in several regions related to empathy and social
cognition (DMPFC, MPFC, TPJ, and amygdala). The results reveal how attention impacts
empathic processes and provides insight into how empathy may unfold in everyday
interactions.
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INTRODUCTION
Empathy allows us to understand and share others’ emotions, cre-
ating a bridge between the self and the innermost experiences
of another person. As we interact with others in our every-
day lives, we may respond empathically to one person, but fail
to connect with how another person is feeling. While previous
research has suggested that certain factors—such as similarity to
the target and familiarity with an experience—can trigger empa-
thy (Preston and De Waal, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2006; Xu et al.,
2009), very little research has examined how attention impacts
our ability to empathize. Past research suggests that empathy
may occur instantaneously and automatically when we recognize
another’s emotional state (Preston and De Waal, 2002), even if
we are cognitively busy. However, other research suggests that
empathy is disrupted when we are distracted and cognitively
occupied (Gu and Han, 2007). Because attentional resources are
often depleted during everyday interactions, it is important to
know if empathy is automatically engaged or requires controlled
and effortful processing. Thus, the current study examines the
role of automaticity and attention in neural processes underlying
empathy.
CORE NEURAL REGIONS FOR EMPATHY
A key reason to look at empathy for multiple emotions under a
variety of attentional conditions is that it allows for an analysis
of core neural regions for empathy. Previous research has identi-
fied neural regions that are consistently activated during empathy
for physical pain (i.e., dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, dACC; and
anterior insula, AI) (Morrison et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004;
Botvinick et al., 2005; Jackson et al., 2005; Zaki et al., 2007; Xu
et al., 2009; Lamm et al., 2011). These reliable activations in the
dACC and AI have led some researchers to conclude that these
regions are part of a core network in empathy (Fan et al., 2011).
However, it is unknown whether the dACC and AI are essential
to empathic processes more generally (i.e., not just empathy for
pain) and whether these regions are activated during empathy for
both positive and negative emotions.
Recent neuroimaging research suggests that other neural
regions—such as the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC; BA 10),
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC; BA 9), and ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC; BA 11)—may be involved in empathic
processes. For example, accurate empathic judgments are associ-
ated with increased MPFC activity (Zaki et al., 2009). MPFC is
also consistently activated in mentalizing or theory of mind tasks
in which participants infer the mental states of others (Frith and
Frith, 2006). In addition, empathy for social and emotional pain
activates both MPFC and DMPFC (Masten et al., 2011; Bruneau
et al., 2012; Meyer et al., 2012). For patients with neurodegen-
erative disease, atrophy in MPFC and DMPFC is associated with
empathic deficits (Rankin et al., 2003, 2006). In addition, lesion
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 160 | 1
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
Morelli and Lieberman Automaticity and attention during empathy
patients with profound empathy deficits have damage in VMPFC
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2003). Perspective-taking, a key compo-
nent of empathy, also activates DMPFC (D’Argembeau et al.,
2007) and VMPFC (Ames et al., 2008). Finally, judging the emo-
tional states of others increases MPFC, DMPFC, and VMPFC
activity (Farrow et al., 2001). Notably, many of these studies
did not examine empathy for physical pain and instead focused
on neural responses during empathy for other emotions (e.g.,
social pain). Thus, MPFC, DMPFC, and VMPFCmay be involved
in empathic processing more generally and may not have been
implicated in previous research due to an exclusive focus on
empathy for pain.
Additionally, we posit that empathy may increase prosocial
motivation and neural activity in SA. In fact, numerous animal
studies have demonstrated that the septal area is critical formater-
nal caregiving (Stack et al., 2002; Gammie, 2005). Recent analyses
on a subset of this data also provide tentative evidence that SA
activation during empathy predicts daily prosocial behavior in
humans (Morelli et al., in press). In addition, past fMRI research
has shown that SA activity is related to prosocial behavior, such as
charitable donations and providing support to others (Krueger
et al., 2007; Inagaki and Eisenberger, 2012; Moll et al., 2011;
Eisenberger and Cole, 2012). Thus, we speculate that the septal
area, along with DMPFC, MPFC, and VMPFC, may be a core
neural region for empathy. The current study examined these and
other regions during empathy for three emotions (happiness, sad-
ness, and anxiety), in order to identify regions commonly active
during empathy.
EMPATHY UNDER DIFFERENT ATTENTIONAL CONDITIONS
Relatively little is known about the operational characteristics
of empathy and how empathic processes are affected by differ-
ent attentional conditions. Does being under cognitive load alter
the degree of empathy a person feels? The influential Perception-
Action Model of empathy suggests that empathy should not
be affected by cognitive load (Preston and De Waal, 2002).
Preston and De Waal (2002) wrote “attended perception of
the object’s state automatically activates the subject’s represen-
tations of the state, situation, and object, and that activation
of these representations automatically primes or generates the
associated autonomic and somatic responses, unless inhibited”
(p. 4). By this account, seeing someone else in an emotional
state automatically generates emotion in the perceiver, regard-
less of cognitive load. Perhaps influenced by this statement, very
few fMRI studies of empathy have asked participants to do
anything besides passively watch empathically-relevant video or
images.
Three studies have looked at cognitive load effects, all showing
reduced neural responses in empathy-related regions (i.e., dACC,
AI, MPFC) (Gu and Han, 2007; Fan and Han, 2008; Rameson
et al., 2012). However, Rameson et al. (2012) also observed that
those individuals highest in trait empathy showed no reductions,
neurally or experientially, under load. In addition, Fan and Han
(2008) demonstrated that an early component of empathic neu-
ral responses is unaffected by cognitive load, whereas a later
component of empathic neural responses is dampened by cog-
nitive load. Thus, the present study aims to more thoroughly
explore this question and to examine how cognitive load impacts
empathy for a variety of emotional experiences (i.e., happiness,
sadness, and anxiety). Based on past research, we hypothesized
that regions related to controlled processes, such as mentalizing
(e.g., MPFC), would be reduced under cognitive load (Rameson
et al., 2012). In addition, we posited that cognitive load would
dampen affective responses to the targets, reducing activity in
regions associated with positive affect during empathy for hap-
piness (e.g., VMPFC) and regions associated with negative affect
during empathy for sadness and anxiety (e.g., dACC and AI)
(Morelli et al., in press).
While cognitive load instructions might diminish empathy-
related processes that are not fully automatic, other instructions
might amplify responses in those same regions. Although some
studies have explicitly focused participants’ attention on the expe-
rience of a target individual or the similarity between the observer
and target (Lamm et al., 2007; Sheng and Han, 2012), studies
have not typically compared neural responses during directed
empathy instructions relative to passive watching instructions.
Such a comparison is important not only because it can high-
light the attentional malleability of empathic processes, but also
because it can help characterize what participants are actually
doing when unconstrained during passive watching. We previ-
ously reported on this comparison in the context of empathy for
sadness and found no differences in dACC and insula, but found
significantly greater MPFC activity during instructed empathiz-
ing compared to passive watching (Rameson et al., 2012). In the
current study, we expand on this analysis to include a comparison
of passive watching and instructed empathizing with three emo-
tions (happiness, sadness, and anxiety). Based on past research,
we predicted that instructions to empathize would amplify neural
responses in regions related to mentalizing (e.g., MPFC), as well
as affect-related regions (e.g., dACC, AI, and VMPFC).
OVERVIEW
In our past work, parts of the present dataset have been analyzed,
and the results have begun to address some of these outstand-
ing questions. For example, we have previously examined how
cognitive load affects neural and behavioral responses during
empathy for sadness (Rameson et al., 2012). In addition, we
compared neural responses when participants were instructed
to empathize versus passively observe others’ sadness (Rameson
et al., 2012). More recently, we also examined neural similari-
ties and differences when participants actively empathized with
positive emotions (i.e., happiness) and negative emotions (i.e.,
pain and anxiety) (Morelli et al., in press). However, we have not
comprehensively assessed how different attentional conditions
may impact neural and behavioral responses during empathy for
happiness, sadness, and anxiety. Further, none of the current anal-
yses have been previously published and represent a novel and
systematic approach to addressing our key questions.
More specifically, the main goal of the current study was to
explore how neural activity during empathy is affected by differ-
ent attentional conditions (i.e., watching, empathizing, and under
cognitive load). By measuring neural activity during empathy for
various emotions, we first aimed to pinpoint core neural regions
that are activated whenever one might be experiencing empathy.
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We then examined whether observing others’ emotional experi-
ences (i.e., watch instructions) engaged similar or different neural
regions than actively empathizing with others’ emotional expe-
riences (i.e., empathize instructions). We also tested if cognitive
load would diminish the involvement of core neural regions for
empathy. Lastly, we examined what neural regions were automat-
ically engaged during empathy and active across all attentional
conditions.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Informed consent was obtained from 32 healthy, right-handed
undergraduates (16 male; mean age = 19.9, SD = 1.4) who were
told the purpose of the study was to learn how emotion is
processed in the brain. A subset of the data from these same par-
ticipants has been previously reported (Morelli et al., in press;
Rameson et al., 2012).
PROCEDURE
Participants completed a functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) empathy task using naturalistic stimuli, specifically
photos of individuals in happy, sad, anxious, and neutral situa-
tions. Stimuli were presented under three conditions: watching
naturally (watch), actively empathizing (empathize), and under
cognitive load (memorize; memorizing an 8-digit number). After
exiting the MRI scanner, participants rated their empathic con-
cern for targets in the empathy task.
EMPATHY TASK IN MRI SCANNER
Conditions
In the neutral condition, participants viewed blocks of pho-
tos with people performing everyday non-emotional actions
(e.g., ironing, cutting vegetables). For all other conditions,
participants completed an empathy task involving three
emotions—happiness, sadness, and anxiety—and three types
of instructions—watch, empathize, and memorize. Each block
consisted of a contextual sentence describing a situation followed
by six photos depicting different individuals in that situation
(Figure 1). Happy situations included events like being hired
for one’s dream job or being the first person in the family to
graduate from college. Examples of sad situations were attend-
ing a loved one’s funeral or being fired from a job. Anxiety
situations described events such as potentially not graduating
due to a bad grade or being medically examined for a serious
illness.
Photo stimuli
For the neutral condition, the photo stimuli were adapted from
Jackson et al. (2005). For all other conditions, the photo sets were
developed by the authors. Within each block, half of the targets
were male and half female. An arrow indicated the target indi-
vidual if a photo depicted several people. Images were equated
across conditions on arousal, valence, luminance, and complexity,
and sentences were equated on length. Images were selected from
a larger pool in order to equate them on a number of features.
FIGURE 1 | Participants viewed naturalistic stimuli with three types of
instructions: (A) watch, (B) empathize, and (C) memorize combined with
three different emotions: (1) happiness, (2) sadness, and (3) anxiety.
Therefore, participants saw nine different block types: happy watch, sad
watch, anxiety watch, happy empathize, sad empathize, anxiety empathize,
happy memorize, sad memorize, and anxiety memorize.
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Blocks were equated across instruction type on arousal, lumi-
nance, complexity, and the number of letters in each contextual
sentence preceding that block. Subjective ratings of valence and
arousal were made by 16 (8 male) undergraduate pilot judges.
Raters judged the valence of each photo on a scale from 1 (very
negative) to 7 (very positive), and arousal on a scale from 1 (very
weak) to 7 (very strong). Luminance was measured using Adobe
Photoshop CS. Complexity was determined using the size of each
image in jpeg (compressed) format (Calvo and Lang, 2004). In
previous research, compressed image file sizes have been shown
to be highly correlated with both subjective measures of complex-
ity (Donderi, 2006; Tuch et al., 2009) and objective visual search
performance (Donderi and McFadden, 2005).
Task instructions
For all conditions, participants were told photos depicted real
events drawn from news stories, documentaries, and blogs. For
the neutral condition, participants were simply asked to look at
the photos for the whole time they were on the screen. For the
watch condition, participants were instructed to respond to the
photos naturally, as if they were at home and had come across
the images in a magazine. For the empathize condition, partic-
ipants were told to take each target’s perspective and imagine
how he/she felt about the situation and how it affected his/her
life. These instructions have previously been shown to induce
empathic concern (Toi and Batson, 1982). For the memorize
condition, participants were told to keep an 8-digit number in
memory while looking at the images.
Task timing and display order
The neutral condition consisted of four blocks; each block dis-
played 16 neutral photos for 2 s each. For the empathy task, each
emotion had a total of nine blocks, divided into three instruction
types: watch (3 blocks), empathize (3 blocks), and memorize (3
blocks). For the watch blocks, the contextual sentence was dis-
played for 4 s, followed by 6 photos presented for 4 s each. The
empathize blocks displayed the contextual sentence for 4 s, fol-
lowed by the instruction to “empathize” for 2 s, then ended with
6 photos for 4 s each. For memorize blocks, the contextual sen-
tence was displayed for 4 s, followed by the cue to “memorize”
for 2 s, then an 8-digit number for 3 s, then the block of 6 pho-
tos for 4 s each, and finally a memory test for the number for
4 s. Participants chose between the correct number and a num-
ber that was identical except for one digit. For all conditions,
each block was separated by a 12-s rest period. The first run con-
sisted exclusively of three watch blocks for each emotion, as this
instruction type was meant to capture unprimed, spontaneous
reactions. In the next two runs, participants were cued to trial
type by the word “empathize” or “memorize,” which appeared
for 2 s after each sentence. Three empathize blocks and three
memorize blocks were included for each emotion, intermixing
empathize and memorize blocks across the two runs. Lastly, the
third run included the four neutral blocks.
fMRI ACQUISITION AND DATA ANALYSIS
Scanning was performed on a Siemens Trio 3T. Functional
images were acquired using an EPI gradient-echo sequence
(TR = 2000ms, TE = 30ms, 4mm slice thickness/no gap,
FOV = 19.2 cm, matrix = 64 × 64, flip angle = 90◦). A T2-
weighted structural image was acquired coplanar with the
functional images (TR = 5000ms, TE = 34ms, 4mm slice thick-
ness/no gap, FOV = 19.2 cm, matrix = 128 × 128, flip angle =
90◦). All images were scalped using the Brain Extraction Tool
of FSL (FMRIB Software Library; Oxford University, Oxford,
UK) and realigned within runs using MCFLIRT. Images were
then checked for residual motion and noise spikes using a cus-
tom automated diagnostic tool (thresholded at 2mm motion or
2% global signal change from one image to the next). In SPM8
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London), all
functional and anatomical images were reoriented to set the
origin to the anterior commissure and the horizontal (y) axis
parallel to the AC-PC line. Also in SPM 8, functional images
were realigned within and between runs to correct for residual
head motion, and coregistered to the matched-bandwidth struc-
tural scan using a 6-parameter rigid body transformation. The
coregistered structural scan was then normalized into Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) standard stereotactic space using
the scalped ICBM152 template and the resulting parameters
were applied to all functional images. Finally, the normal-
ized functional images were resliced into voxels of 3mm3 and
smoothed using an 8mm full width at half maximum Gaussian
kernel.
All single subject and group analyses were performed in
SPM8. First-level effects were estimated using the general lin-
ear model and employing a canonical hemodynamic response
function convolved with the experimental design. Low-frequency
noise was removed using a high-pass filter. Group analyses
were conducted using random-effects models to enable popu-
lation inferences (Nichols et al., 2005). To keep all instruction
types as well-constrained and equivalent as possible, empathize,
watch, and memorize trials were modeled using only the 24 s of
image presentation that was invariant across instruction types.
The remaining trial elements—the instruction prompts, contex-
tual sentences, 8-digit number presentation and memory test
(for memorize blocks)- were modeled separately and were not
included in the baseline condition. In addition, the neutral con-
dition was modeled using only the 32 s of image presentation for
each neutral block.
Whole-brain group-level analyses
Whole-brain group-level analyses were performed using an
uncorrected p-value of <0.005 with a cluster threshold of
43 based on a Monte Carlo simulation in AFNI’s Alphasim
effectively producing an FDR of p = 0.05 (Lieberman and
Cunningham, 2009). For visualization of results, group con-
trasts were overlaid on a surface representation of the MNI
canonical brain using the SPM surfrend toolbox and NeuroLens
(http://spmsurfrend.sourceforge.net; http://www.neurolens.org/
NeuroLens/Home.html).
Masked regions of interest analyses
Masked regions of interest (ROI) analyses were con-
ducted using SPM8. Anatomical ROIs were created for
regions commonly involved in empathy (dACC and AI),
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emotion (SA; amygdala; and rostral anterior cingulate cor-
tex, rACC), and mentalizing (DMPFC, MPFC, and TPJ).
Anatomical ROIs were constructed using the Wake Forest
University Pickatlas Tool (Maldjian et al., 2003) with the
Automated Anatomical Labeling Atlas (AAL; Tzourio-Mazoyer
et al., 2002) or using Marsbar (http://marsbar.sourceforge.
net).
A cingulate ROI that combined Brodmann Areas (BA) 24 and
32 (dilated to 2mm) as well as the AAL anterior, middle, and pos-
terior cingulate was divided into the dACC (bounded between
y = 33 and y = 0) and the rACC (bounded between y = 54 and
y = 34) (Bush et al., 2002; Vogt et al., 2003; Beckmann et al.,
2009). AAL insula was bounded caudally at y = 0 to include
only the anterior region and did not include pars opercularis,
pars triangularis, or pars orbitalis. The SA ROI consisted of
a box that extends from x = −6 to x = 6, y = −2 to y = 0,
and z = 0 to z = 10, and is based on the Atlas of the Human
Brain (Mai et al., 2004). The amygdala ROI was taken directly
from AAL.
The MPFC and DMPFC ROIs were manually constructed in
FSLview in a voxel-by-voxel fashion, informed by recent meta-
analyses and reviews pertaining to MPFC function (both anterior
rostral and dorsal aspects) and using the AAL labeling scheme
as implemented in the WFU Pickatlas for comparison and refer-
ence (Steele and Lawrie, 2004; Amodio and Frith, 2006; Northoff
et al., 2006). The DMPFC ROI was bounded ventrally at z = 26
to distinguish from MPFC, laterally at x = ±20 to include only
the medial aspect, and caudally at y = 44 to exclude anterior
cingulate. The MPFC ROI was bounded dorsally at z = 24 to dis-
tinguish from DMPFC, ventrally at z = −10 to distinguish from
VMPFC, laterally at x = ±20 to include only the medial aspect,
and caudally at y = 46 to exclude anterior cingulate. The TPJ
ROI was created using the union of BA 22, 39, and 40, bounded
between x = ±38, y = −40 and −68, and z = 22 and 38 (Decety
and Lamm, 2007).
An overall mask for all cortical ROIs was submitted to Monte
Carlo simulations, which determined that an uncorrected p-value
of 0.005 with a cluster threshold of 28 voxels yielded a p < 0.05
FDR correction. Because subcortical regions tend to be substan-
tially smaller, individual masks were created for SA and amygdala.
Monte Carlo simulations indicated that for these smaller regions
an uncorrected p-value of 0.005 with a cluster threshold of 3
voxels provided the same FDR correction.
POST-SCANNER EMPATHY RATINGS
Immediately post-scan, participants rated their empathic reaction
to each block in the empathy task. Participants viewed the original
task again, butwith shorter presentation times (1 s per image) and
without the neutral condition. Participants were told to remem-
ber how they felt when they first saw the images. For happy blocks,
participants rated how happy they were for the targets on a scale
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). For sad and anxiety blocks,
participants rated how concerned they felt for the targets on a
scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Participants were told
“concerned” meant how compassionate, sympathetic, and moved
they felt, as these adjectives have been used to assess empathy in
previous research (Toi and Batson, 1982).
RESULTS
POST-SCANNER EMPATHY RATINGS
Due to technical difficulties, post-scan ratings for three par-
ticipants were not collected. A three (happy, sad, anxiety) by
three (watch, empathize, memorize) repeated-measures ANOVA
revealed a main effect of instruction type on experienced empa-
thy, F(2, 56) = 29.64, p < 0.001, as well as a main effect of emo-
tion type on experienced empathy, F(2, 56) = 7.25, p < 0.005.
However, the interaction between emotion type and instruc-
tion type was not significant. Follow-up paired samples t-tests
showed that participants reported less empathy during memo-
rize blocks (M = 5.23, SD = 0.96) than during the empathize
blocks (M = 5.55, SD = 0.76), t(28) = −2.78, p < 0.05, or dur-
ing the watch blocks (M = 5.57, SD = 0.84), t(28) = −3.30, p <
0.005 (Figure 2). Empathize and watch blocks did not differ sig-
nificantly on reported empathy. Participants also reported expe-
riencing reduced empathy for anxiety (M = 4.97, SD = 0.90)
compared to happiness (M = 5.67, SD = 0.84), t(28) = −5.67,
p < 0.001, and to sadness (M = 5.70, SD = 0.87), t(28) = −9.00,
p < 0.001. Self-reported empathy did not differ significantly for
happiness and sadness.
fMRI RESULTS
Behavioral performance during memorize blocks
Accuracy rate was 84% (SD = 20%) for the memory test after
each memorize block, indicating that participants were perform-
ing the memory task as intended.
Overview of effects
Given that our 3 × 3 experimental design yielded many potential
comparisons, we wanted to provide an overview of the data and
identify patterns across the nine cells of our design. Therefore, we
looked for effects in the eight ROIs for each of the nine conditions
compared to the neutral condition. We conducted masked ROI
FIGURE 2 | Self-reported empathy showed a main effect of instruction
type with participants reporting less empathy during memorize
instructions than during empathize or watch instructions. The
empathize and watch conditions did not differ significantly on self-reported
empathy.
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analyses using regions commonly involved in empathy (dACC
and AI), emotion (SA, amygdala, and rACC), and mentalizing
(DMPFC, MPFC, and TPJ).
Table 1 shows a summary of regions that produced significant
activations for each of the nine cells of our design and reveals a
number of interesting patterns. Regions related to mentalizing
(DMPFC, MPFC, and TPJ) produced reliable activations dur-
ing empathize and watch instructions, but were not activated
during memorize instructions. Somewhat surprisingly, the amyg-
dala showed the same pattern. In contrast, dACC was reliably
present during memorize instructions, but only appeared in two
of the six remaining non-memorize blocks. Finally, SA activations
were present during all nine trial types, and AI activations were
present during eight of the nine trial types. Out of the 8 ROIs,
the only the SA and AI were consistently activated across condi-
tions. rACC was also observed in five of the nine trial types, but
with no particular pattern with respect to emotion or attentional
instructions.
Common activations during empathy for happiness, sadness, and
anxiety
Our first goal was to identify core neural regions that were
activated across different kinds of empathic experiences. To deter-
mine whether any neural regions were commonly recruited when
trying to empathize with each of three different emotions, we used
a conjunction analysis (Nichols et al., 2005) for the comparison
of the empathize condition to the neutral condition for each of
the three emotion types (happiness, sadness, and anxiety). This
method only yielded clusters that were significantly active in each
of the three contributing contrasts.
First, a contrast image was created for each emotion type that
compared empathize instructions to the neutral condition (i.e.,
Happy Empathize > Neutral, Sad Empathize > Neutral, and
Anxiety Empathize > Neutral). Then, a conjunction analysis of
all three contrast images was used to identify neural regions that
were commonly recruited when empathizing with the three emo-
tions. This conjunction analysis across emotion types revealed
common activity in MPFC, DMPFC, and amygdala, regions typ-
ically associated with mentalizing and emotion (see Figure 3A,
Table 2). Slightly lowering the voxel extent for this contrast also
revealed activation in SA (with the peak voxel at x = 3, y = 2,
z = 4; t = 3.51; k = 38).
Similarly, the conjunction analysis across emotion types when
watching others’ emotional experiences (i.e., a conjunction of
Happy Watch > Neutral, Sad Watch > Neutral, and Anxiety
Watch > Neutral) produced common activations in a variety
of regions related to social cognition (i.e., MPFC, DMPFC, TPJ,
and pSTS), as well as in ventral AI and amygdala (see Figure 3B,
Table 2). Lowering the voxel extent for this contrast once again
revealed activation in SA (with the peak voxel at x = 0, y = −4,
z = −2; t = 3.31; k = 16).
In contrast, when participants viewed the same kinds of emo-
tional scenes but were focused onmemorizing an 8-digit number,
mentalizing-related regions were not commonly activated across
emotion types. Instead, the conjunction of Happy Memorize >
Neutral, Sad Memorize > Neutral, and Anxiety Memorize >
Neutral yielded common activity in SA and in regions associ-
ated with controlled processes and salience detection: dACC and
dorsal AI (see Figure 3C, Table 2). Taken together, these results
suggest that regions related to mentalizing and emotion may
be critical for generating empathic responses. However, cogni-
tive load may disrupt activity in these core regions and reduce
empathic responding.
Neural similarities and differences between empathizing and
watching
To determine if reacting naturally (i.e., watching) and trying
to empathize activated common neural regions, we ran addi-
tional conjunction analyses. For these analyses, we collapsed
all empathize blocks into one condition and all watch blocks
Table 1 | Patterns of neural activity for each instruction type (compared to viewing neutral photos) within anatomically-defined regions of
interest previously associated with empathy, emotion, and mentalizing.
dACC AI Septal Amygdala rACC DMPFC MPFC R TPJ
EMPATHIZE
Happy • • • • •
Sad • • • • • • •
Anxiety • • • • • •
WATCH
Happy • • • • • • •
Sad • • • • • • •
Anxiety • • • • • •
MEMORIZE
Happy • • • •
Sad • • •
Anxiety • • • •
Note. Cells were marked using a threshold of p < 0.005 and a 28 voxel extent which provides FDR corrected p < 0.05. Separate ROI masks were created for the
septal area and amygdala. In these regions, marked cells are significant at p < 0.005 and a 3 voxel extent (p < 0.05 FDR corrected). For anterior insula and amygdala,
cell are marked if a significant cluster appeared in either hemisphere.
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FIGURE 3 | Neural overlap during empathy for happiness, sadness, and
anxiety using conjunction analyses for the contrasts (A) Happy
Empathize > Neutral, Sad Empathize > Neutral, and Anxiety Empathize
> Neutral (B) Happy Watch > Neutral, Sad Watch > Neutral, and
Anxiety Watch > Neutral, and (C) Happy Memorize > Neutral, Sad
Memorize > Neutral, and Anxiety Memorize > Neutral. In both the
empathize and watch conjunction analyses, DMPFC and MPFC were two of
the common neural areas across emotions. However, DMPFC and MPFC did
not appear in the memorize conjunction analysis; instead, dACC and AI were
two of the common neural areas across emotions.
Table 2 | Neural regions that were commonly activated during happiness, sadness, and anxiety for empathize compared to neutral, watch
compared to neutral, and memorize compared to neutral.
Region BA Hemisphere K Coordinates t
x y z
CONJUNCTION OF HAPPY EMPATHIZE > NEUTRAL, SAD EMPATHIZE > NEUTRAL, AND ANXIETY EMPATHIZE > NEUTRAL
Medial prefrontal cortex/dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 10/9 R 70 6 59 13 3.86
Amygdala – R 61 18 −4 −11 4.41
L 46 −21 −7 −11 5.01
CONJUNCTION OF HAPPY WATCH > NEUTRAL, SAD WATCH > NEUTRAL, AND ANXIETY WATCH > NEUTRAL
Medial prefrontal cortex 10 R 4211 6 59 16 3.70
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 9/8 R 4211 3 56 31 3.93
Temporoparietal junction/posterior superior temporal sulcus 40 R 101 54 −43 16 4.30
Anterior insula 13 L 642 −42 14 −17 3.79
Amygdala – R 49 18 −7 −14 4.33
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 47 L 642 −45 29 −2 3.97
Dorsal premotor cortex 6 R 64 6 11 67 5.15
Fusiform 37 R 44 42 −55 −14 5.09
Occipital lobe 19/18 – 387 −6 −97 25 6.97
CONJUNCTION OF HAPPY MEMORIZE > NEUTRAL, SAD MEMORIZE > NEUTRAL, AND ANXIETY MEMORIZE > NEUTRAL
Septal area – L 55 −3 −4 1 3.41
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 32 R 5003 3 29 31 4.42
Anterior insula 13 R 199 39 23 10 5.28
L 223 −33 23 4 6.36
Dorsal premotor cortex 6 L 5003 −6 2 64 5.87
Note. BA refers to putative Brodmann’s Area; L and R refer to left and right hemispheres; k refers to the cluster size (in voxels); x, y, and z refer to MNI coordinates in
the left-right, anterior-posterior, and inferior-superior dimensions, respectively; t refers to the t-score at those coordinates (local maxima). Regions with ks that share
a superscript originate from the same cluster.
into one condition, regardless of emotion. We then created a
contrast image that compared empathize instructions to the neu-
tral condition (i.e., Empathize > Neutral) and another contrast
that compared watch instructions to the neutral baseline (i.e.,
Watch > Neutral). A conjunction analysis of these two con-
trast images was then used to identify neural regions that were
commonly recruited when trying to empathize or simply watch.
This conjunction analysis showed activity in regions previously
associated with social cognition, including the MPFC, DMPFC,
VMPFC/rACC, TPJ, pSTS, and temporal poles, in addition to
regions related to emotion, including SA, amygdala, and ventral
AI (Table 3 and Figure 4).
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To identify differences between empathize instructions and
watch instructions, we compared the empathize and watch con-
ditions (Table 4). We did not find a large number of neural
differences between the two instruction types, which is consistent
with our finding that self-reported empathy was at similar levels
for each instruction type. For the contrast Watch > Empathize,
there was increased activation in some regions related to social
cognition, namely DMPFC, precuneus, and pSTS. However, it
appears that trying to empathize and watching naturallymay have
more neural similarities than differences.
Cognitive load effects
Next, we wanted to more directly test whether cognitive load
(i.e., memorize blocks) would diminish the involvement of neural
regions that were active when empathizing or watching naturally.
Because we were primarily interested in the effect of cognitive
load, the following analyses collapse all empathize blocks into
one condition, all watch blocks into a second condition, and all
memorize blocks into a third condition. To identify what regions
were less active under load compared to actively empathizing,
we compared empathize blocks (all emotion types) to memo-
rize blocks (all emotion types) (see Table 5). For this contrast
Empathize>Memorize, we found activations in regions typically
associated with social cognition (i.e., MPFC, DMPFC, VMPFC,
precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex, TPJ, pSTS, and temporal
poles) and emotional arousal (i.e., amygdala) (see Figure 5). For
the contrast Watch > Memorize, we observed activations in the
same set of neural regions (see Table 5).
We also identified regions that were more active under load
compared to empathizing (Memorize > Empathize) and more
active under load compared to watching naturally (Memorize
> Watch) (see Table 6). For both of these contrasts, dACC,
AI, VLPFC, DLPFC, dorsal premotor cortex, and supplemen-
tary motor area were more active under load. In sum, putting
FIGURE 4 | Neural regions that were commonly activated during the empathize and watch conditions (collapsing across emotions) compared to
neutral.
Table 3 | Neural regions that were commonly activated during empathize and watch (collapsed across happiness, sadness, and anxiety)
compared to neutral.
Region BA Hemisphere k Coordinates t
x y z
CONJUNCTION OF EMPATHIZE > NEUTRAL AND WATCH > NEUTRAL
Medial prefrontal cortex 10 R 7131 6 62 13 5.21
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 8/9 R 7131 6 56 28 4.30
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex/rostral anterior cingulate cortex 11/32 L 7131 −3 47 −11 4.51
Temporoparietal junction/posterior superior temporal sulcus 40 R 148 51 −40 10 5.20
Temporal poles/middle temporal gyrus 38/21 L 2752 −54 2 −17 3.96
Septal area – R 150 3 −1 −2 4.03
Anterior insula 13 L 2752 −42 14 −17 5.50
Amygdala/hippocampus – R 119 18 −7 −11 5.54
L 2752 −18 −10 −14 6.21
Dorsal premotor cortex 6 R 112 3 8 67 5.91
Occipital lobe 18/19 L 151 −3 −91 28 5.35
Note. BA refers to putative Brodmann’s Area; L and R refer to left and right hemispheres; k refers to the cluster size (in voxels); x, y, and z refer to MNI coordinates in
the left-right, anterior-posterior, and inferior-superior dimensions, respectively; t refers to the t-score at those coordinates (local maxima). Regions with ks that share
a superscript originate from the same cluster.
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Table 4 | Neural regions that were more active for empathize compared to watch (collapsing across emotions), as well as neural regions that
were more active for watch compared to empathize (collapsing across emotions).
Region BA Hemisphere k Coordinates t
x y z
EMPATHIZE >WATCH
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 32/24 L 2891 −9 11 34 4.06
Supplementary motor area 6 R 2891 9 −7 55 4.36
Putamen – L 59 −18 11 −8 4.43
Precentral gyrus 6 L 48 −21 −16 76 3.97
Postcentral gyrus 1/2 R 89 57 −22 55 3.39
WATCH > EMPATHIZE
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 8/9 − 229 0 56 40 4.10
Precuneus 7/31 R 28702 6 −67 40 3.93
Posterior superior temporal sulcus/middle temporal gyrus 22 R 100 51 −43 −2 4.61
L 158 −63 −40 1 4.67
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 8/9/10 R 788 45 35 37 6.07
Inferior parietal lobule/superior parietal lobule 40/7/39 R 726 42 −52 49 5.63
L 706 −45 −52 40 4.95
Fusiform 37 R 28702 45 −55 −17 3.87
L 28702 −42 −55 −20 3.68
Occipital lobe 18/19 R 28702 6 −79 1 4.28
Cerebellum – L 28702 −3 −82 −26 6.85
Note. BA refers to putative Brodmann’s Area; L and R refer to left and right hemispheres; k refers to the cluster size (in voxels); x, y, and z refer to MNI coordinates in
the left-right, anterior-posterior, and inferior-superior dimensions, respectively; t refers to the t-score at those coordinates (local maxima). Regions with ks that share
a superscript originate from the same cluster.
FIGURE 5 | Neural regions that showed reduced activity under cognitive load compared to empathizing (Empathize >Memorize).
people under cognitive load while looking at emotional stimuli
may reduce activity in regions associated with social cognition
and emotional arousal and increase neural activity in regions
associated with attention and effort (Table 7).
Automaticity
Lastly, we examined what neural regions may be automatically
engaged during empathy and remain active regardless of the
attentional condition. Similar to previous analyses, we collapsed
all empathize blocks into one condition, all watch blocks into one
condition, and all memorize blocks into one condition. We then
created a contrast image that compared empathize instructions
to the neutral condition (i.e., Empathize > Neutral), another
contrast that compared watch instructions to the neutral condi-
tion (i.e., Watch > Neutral), and a final contrast that compared
memorize instructions to the neutral condition (i.e., Memorize
> Neutral). Finally, a conjunction analysis of these three con-
trast images was used to identify neural regions that are engaged
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Table 5 | Neural regions that were less active under cognitive load compared to empathize (collapsed across emotions) and less active under
cognitive load compared to watch (collapsed across emotions).
Region BA Hemisphere k Coordinates t
x y z
EMPATHIZE > MEMORIZE
Medial prefrontal cortex 10 L 11971 −6 62 1 4.03
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 8/9 R 11971 3 56 28 5.87
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 11 – 11971 0 38 −14 6.40
Precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex 31 L 69032 −6 −55 16 5.77
Temporoparietal junction/posterior superior temporal sulcus 22/39 R 69032 57 −49 10 6.51
L 69032 −42 −70 22 6.53
Temporal pole/middle temporal gyrus 21/38 R 69032 54 −1 −17 8.27
L 69032 −45 14 −23 6.23
Amygdala – R 69032 21 −4 −17 6.61
L 69032 −21 −7 −17 5.53
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 46 R 45 54 38 10 5.37
Supplementary motor area 6 R 7503 3 −16 58 3.99
Inferior parietal lobule 40 R 113 57 −28 37 4.65
Hippocampus – R 69032 30 −16 −14 6.60
L 69032 −30 −16 −14 6.21
Fusiform 37 R 69032 24 −40 −14 9.99
L 69032 −24 −46 −11 10.84
Precentral/postcentral gyrus 6/4 R 7503 18 −43 70 4.78
Cerebellum – R 127 30 −79 −32 5.84
L 137 −21 −79 −32 6.52
L 212 −6 −52 −41 4.50
Occipital lobe 19 R 69032 42 −79 25 12.50
L 69032 −42 −70 22 6.53
WATCH >MEMORIZE
Medial prefrontal cortex 10 R 17284 3 68 10 5.59
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 8/9 R 17284 3 56 40 5.99
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 11 L 17284 −6 38 −14 5.52
Precuneus 7 R 171 9 −64 70 3.81
Temporoparietal junction/posterior superior temporal sulcus 22/39/40 R 93625 57 −49 10 6.52
L 93625 −48 −70 19 6.54
Temporal poles 38 L 93625 −54 2 −20 6.05
Amygdala – R 93625 30 −10 −14 7.72
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 45/46/47 R 17284 57 23 28 5.04
L 93625 −48 41 −8 6.51
Dorsal premotor cortex 6 L 17284 −9 32 55 5.93
Hippocampus – R 93625 27 −16 −11 7.87
Fusiform 37 R 93625 36 −46 −8 7.10
L 93625 −30 −40 −14 7.89
Middle temporal gyrus 21/22 R 93625 60 −7 −14 7.75
L 93625 −57 −16 −14 7.43
Angular gyrus 39 R 93625 42 −70 25 8.01
L 93625 −48 −70 31 8.73
Occipital lobe 19 R 93625 36 −70 7 6.68
L 93625 −33 −85 31 7.24
Cerebellum – L 93625 −24 −79 −32 7.84
Note. BA refers to putative Brodmann’s Area; L and R refer to left and right hemispheres; k refers to the cluster size (in voxels); x, y, and z refer to MNI coordinates in
the left-right, anterior-posterior, and inferior-superior dimensions, respectively; t refers to the t-score at those coordinates (local maxima). Regions with ks that share
a superscript originate from the same cluster.
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Table 6 | Neural regions that were more active under cognitive load compared to empathize (collapsed across emotions) and more active
under cognitive load compared to watch (collapsed across emotions).
Region BA Hemisphere k Coordinates t
x y z
MEMORIZE > EMPATHIZE
Precuneus 7 R 22891 12 −64 40 6.05
L 22891 −12 −64 52 4.64
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 32/24 R 27322 9 29 31 5.35
Anterior insula 13 R 249 36 17 10 6.09
L 27322 −36 20 1 6.23
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 46/47 L 27322 −36 26 28 4.90
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 10 R 27322 33 53 22 6.72
L 27322 −39 50 22 7.41
Inferior parietal lobule 40 R 406 48 −40 49 5.67
L 22891 −48 −43 52 6.28
Dorsal premotor cortex/supplementary motor area 6 L 23722 −6 2 61 8.13
Precentral gyrus/inferior frontal gyrus 6/9 L 27322 −54 −7 49 6.40
Middle/superior frontal gyrus 6 R 72 21 8 64 4.45
Middle cingulate 23 – 151 0 −22 28 5.29
Occipital lobe 18 L 22891 −9 −76 4 10.62
Cerebellum – R 67 27 −67 −20 4.47
MEMORIZE >WATCH
Precuneus 7 R 56 12 −67 40 4.03
L 118 −9 −73 43 4.83
Temporoparietal junction 40 L 4123 −51 −49 28 4.28
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 32/24 R 11114 6 26 31 5.97
Anterior insula 13 R 244 36 20 10 6.64
L 15445 −30 20 4 7.09
Caudate – R 15445 12 8 −2 5.77
L 15445 −6 5 10 3.71
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 10/9 R 389 30 41 37 7.71
L 15445 −36 38 25 5.94
Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex L 15445 −39 26 28 5.38
Inferior parietal lobule 40 L 4123 −48 −40 49 4.92
Dorsal premotor cortex/supplementary motor area 6 L 11114 −6 2 61 11.85
Precentral gyrus/inferior frontal gyrus 6/9 L 15445 −48 −4 43 8.04
Postcentral gyrus 1/2 L 51 −60 −19 25 5.01
Middle cingulate 23 L 90 −3 −22 31 4.71
Note. BA refers to putative Brodmann’s Area; L and R refer to left and right hemispheres; k refers to the cluster size (in voxels); x, y, and z refer to MNI coordinates in
the left-right, anterior-posterior, and inferior-superior dimensions, respectively; t refers to the t-score at those coordinates (local maxima). Regions with ks that share
a superscript originate from the same cluster.
Table 7 | A summary of cognitive load effects that illustrates the relative increases and decreases in activation during empathize and watch
compared to memorize (collapsed across emotions).
dACC AI Septal Amygdala rACC DMPFC MPFC R TPJ
Empathize > Memorize ↓ ↓ * ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Watch > Memorize ↓ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Note. ↑indicates a relative increase in activation for the ROI during empathize relative to memorize and watch relative to memorize. ↓indicates a relative decrease in
activation for the ROI during empathize relative to memorize and watch relative to memorize. *In addition to the AI cluster that was more active during memorize, a
smaller cluster in AI was also more active during empathize compared to memorize.
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Table 8 | Neural regions that were commonly activated during empathize, watch, and memorize (collapsed across emotions) compared to
neutral.
Region BA Hemisphere k Coordinates t
x y z
CONJUNCTION OF EMPATHIZE > NEUTRAL, WATCH > NEUTRAL, AND MEMORIZE > NEUTRAL
Septal area – R 123 3 −1 −2 4.01
Anterior insula 13 – 53 −39 14 −14 4.64
Dorsal premotor cortex 6 R 91 3 8 67 5.91
Occipital lobe 18/19 L 128 −3 −91 28 5.20
Note. BA refers to putative Brodmann’s Area; L and R refer to left and right hemispheres; k refers to the cluster size (in voxels); x, y, and z refer to MNI coordinates in
the left-right, anterior-posterior, and inferior-superior dimensions, respectively; t refers to the t-score at those coordinates (local maxima). Regions with ks that share
a superscript originate from the same cluster.
FIGURE 6 | Neural regions that were commonly activated during
empathize, watch, and memorize (collapsed across emotions) relative
to neutral.
during all three conditions. This conjunction analysis showed
common activity in SA and ventral AI (Table 8 and Figure 6), as
well as the dorsal premotor cortex and occipital lobe. Thus, SA
and ventral AI seem to be automatically engaged during empathy,
regardless of attentional conditions.
DISCUSSION
The results of the present study begin to address several unan-
swered questions in the empathy literature. While most studies
have examined neural processes during empathy for a single nega-
tive emotion, it is unclear whether these neural regions are specific
to empathy for each negative emotion or critical for empathic
processes more broadly. By measuring empathic processes across
multiple emotions, we identified neural regions that are cen-
tral to an empathic state. We also addressed other gaps in the
current research by directly comparing the effects of several atten-
tional conditions (i.e., watch, empathize, memorize) on empathic
processes. More specifically, comparing neural responses dur-
ing empathize and watch instructions allowed us to characterize
what participants are actually doing when instructed to observe
others (typical instructions in most previous studies). By includ-
ing cognitive load instructions, we also identified which neural
regions are automatically engaged during empathy and which
neural regions may be disrupted by reduced attentional resources.
Across analyses, we find evidence for a core set of neural
regions that support an empathic state (i.e., DMPFC, MPFC, TPJ,
amygdala, AI, and SA). When participants observed or actively
empathized with a target, we found relatively consistent activity
in regions related to mentalizing (i.e., DMPFC, MPFC, and TPJ)
across emotions. Conjunction analyses for each instruction type
confirmed this pattern, showing DMPFC and MPFC activation
when empathizing and DMPFC, MPFC, and TPJ activation when
observing others. While studies on empathy for pain have con-
sistently found dACC and AI activation, our results suggest that
regions related to mentalizing may be core neural areas during
empathy for both positive and negative emotions.
Previous research demonstrates that DMPFC, MPFC, and
TPJ are some of the most consistently activated regions when
thinking about the mental states of others (Spreng et al., 2009;
Van Overwalle, 2009; Lieberman, 2010). TPJ activation often
occurs when reasoning about temporary states such as the goals,
intentions, and desires of other people (Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003; Van Overwalle, 2009; Young et al., 2010). Both DMPFC
and MPFC are associated with inferring the enduring dispo-
sitions of the self and others (Van Overwalle, 2009). Because
our task used a variety of emotional and situational contexts,
participants probably thought about both the temporary states
and enduring dispositions of targets. In addition, the stimuli
depicted targets with varied gender, ethnicity, and age, expe-
riencing events that the participants were both familiar and
unfamiliar with. Thus, DMPFC may have been activated when
participants contemplated targets who were dissimilar to them-
selves, while MPFC may have been activated when thinking
about similar targets (Mitchell et al., 2006; Krienen et al., 2010).
Overall, our results suggest that regions related to mentalizing
are central to the experience of empathy, potentially helping
us understand the varied emotional terrain of others’ everyday
experiences.
When participants observed or actively empathized with a tar-
get, we also found very reliable activity in the amygdala across
whole-brain contrasts, as well as in the stricter conjunction anal-
yses. The amygdala should play a central role in empathy because
it is typically active when stimuli are motivationally relevant
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and emotionally impactful (Ewbank et al., 2009; Adolphs, 2010;
Lindquist et al., 2012). Furthermore, amygdala activation is not
emotion-specific and may be part of a distributed network that
helps realize core affect (Lindquist et al., 2012). Thus, our results
suggest that empathy for both positive and negative emotions may
heighten emotional sharing and motivational relevance, leading
to increased amygdala activation.
Interestingly, only ventral AI and SA were reliably activated
across emotions and attentional conditions in whole-brain analy-
ses, suggesting that these regions may be automatically engaged
during empathy. In addition, a conjunction analysis across all
attentional conditions further confirmed the automatic activation
of ventral AI and SA during empathy. Our results suggest that
the ventral anterior insula is a core neural region for empathy
across multiple emotions and is not specific to empathy for pain
(Singer et al., 2009). Ventral AI may be essential to empathic pro-
cesses because it is often activated by the awareness of others’
affective feelings (Wager and Feldman Barrett, 2004; Craig, 2009;
Lindquist et al., 2012). For both autistic individuals and controls,
poorer awareness of other’s emotions is related to hypoactivity in
the AI (Silani et al., 2008; Uddin and Menon, 2009). Therefore,
previous work that shows AI activation during empathy for pain
(Singer et al., 2004) is consistent with the idea that AI may
reflect a heightened awareness of others’ feelings. While the sep-
tal area has not often been associated with empathy, our analyses
suggest that SA should be considered an automatic and core neu-
ral region for empathy. Both prosocial behavior and maternal
caregiving activate the SA (Stack et al., 2002; Gammie, 2005;
Krueger et al., 2007; Inagaki and Eisenberger, 2012), suggesting
that SA activation may generally signal other-oriented feelings
and behaviors. In addition, different analyses on this dataset
have suggested that SA activation predicts daily prosocial behav-
ior and may signal the intention to help others (Morelli et al.,
in press).
When comparing passively observing and actively empathiz-
ing, whole-brain contrasts showed very few neural differences
and many common neural regions across these instruction types.
Common activity occurred in core empathy-related regions (i.e.,
MPFC, DMPFC, and TPJ), social cognition-related regions, (i.e.,
VMPFC/rACC, pSTS, and temporal poles) and affect-related
regions (SA, ventral AI, and amygdala). Also, self-reported empa-
thy did not differ significantly between the empathize and watch
conditions. Our results preliminarily suggest that observing oth-
ers engages similar empathic processes as actively empathizing
with others. Because these analyses capture group-level differ-
ences, future research should explore whether neural activity
during these two instruction types may differ within each indi-
vidual.
We also showed that cognitive load reduces the subjective
experience of empathy, as well as decreasing neural responses in
several core empathy-related regions (i.e., DMPFC, MPFC, TPJ,
amygdala) and social cognition-related regions (i.e., VMPFC,
precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, pSTS, and temporal poles).
This finding suggests that empathy for various emotions is not
entirely automatic, extending previous findings that empathy
for pain and sadness are not automatic (Gu and Han, 2007;
Rameson et al., 2012) and challenging the assumptions of the
Perception-Action Model (Preston and DeWaal, 2002). Cognitive
load also increased activation in dACC and dorsal AI when com-
pared to each of the other conditions (neutral, watch, empathize).
While dACC has been reliably implicated during empathy for
pain, dACC was only consistently activated during cognitive
load in the current study. Thus, dACC may not be universally
activated by empathic processes across emotions. It is possible
that activity in dACC and dorsal AI, as well as DLPFC and
VLPFC, during cognitive load reflected the increased effort and
attention needed to maintain the 8-digit number in memory
(Blasi et al., 2006; Woodward et al., 2006; Mulert et al., 2007).
Further, cognitive load differentially activated the dorsal portion
of the AI, which is associated with cognitive control processes
(Wager and Feldman Barrett, 2004). In contrast, the ventral por-
tion of the AI, typically associated with emotional awareness,
was indicated in the conjunction of the watch and empathize
conditions. Alternatively, dACC and AI may be performing
empathic functions that are amplified under cognitive load. The
role of dACC and AI during cognitive load cannot be deter-
mined from this study alone and should be explored in future
research.
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION
One potential limitation of the current study design was the pre-
sentation of the watch condition in the first run, preceding the
presentation of the other two conditions. Because the watch con-
dition wasmeant to capture participants’ completely spontaneous
reactions to the emotional stimuli, we felt presenting it first was
important for avoiding unwanted interference from the other
instruction types. As is often the case, however, emphasizing eco-
logical validity comes at the cost of experimental control, and
this design produces an order confound. We attempted to min-
imize the effect of this cofound through careful pre-rating of the
stimuli to insure all three conditions were otherwise as equivalent
as possible. Follow-up studies in which all three conditions are
intermixed will be useful in determining what, if any, effect the
presentation order exerted upon the watch condition. A second
limitation is that the neutral condition may not have been ideal.
These photos did not directly show any faces and may not have
controlled for the more detailed and varied emotional photos in
the other conditions. Thus, when comparing the experimental
conditions (i.e., empathize, watch, and memorize) to the neu-
tral condition, some of the observed results—such as increased
activity in the amygdala—may be due to general face processing.
In summary, the current study broadens our understand-
ing of empathy by identifying core neural regions that underlie
the empathic state. In addition, it demonstrates that empathic
processes are not entirely automatic and may be disrupted by
cognitive load. Lastly, the current study suggests that two key
regions—the ventral AI and SA—are automatically engaged dur-
ing empathy, even when attentional resources are reduced. By
examining how attention impacts neural and subjective responses
during empathy, we hope the current findings suggest potential
ways to sustain empathy even in the face of everyday demands
and distractions. Further, these findings indicate that attention
impacts empathic processing and may play a role in empathic
dysfunction in mental disorders such as autism.
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